

paragon of wifely love? A search through encyclopedias and mythological handbooks proves fruitless. Wytttenbach in his note ad loc. suggested the courtesan friend of a minor Ptolemy killed at Ephesus (Athen. 13. 593 a–b), yet this extremely obscure figure hardly merits mention in the same breath with Alcestis. The name must be corrupt. The correct reading becomes apparent from a passage in Aelian's *De natura animalium* 1. 15. After describing how a certain fish, the female wrasse (κόσσυφος), will follow her mate to his death, he asks, 'What will the poets who are always holding up to us Evadne the daughter of Iphis and Alcestis the daughter of Pelias say to this?' The virtue common to the wrasse, Evadne, and Alcestis is of course *φιλανδρία*. Evadne's story, like Alcestis', is known to us from Euripides, who in a dramatic scene of the *Suppliants* (985–1072) presents her leaping upon the pyre of her husband Capaneus. Evadne's sacrifice was well known in antiquity: it is frequently mentioned by Ovid (e.g. *Ars Am.* 3. 21–2, *Trist.* 5. 14. 38, *Pont.* 3. 1. 111) and other Romans,¹ and a painting of the scene is described by Philostratus, *Imag.* 2. 30. Unlike other names associated with female devotion, such as Penelope or Laodamia, Evadne is quite similar to Eirene, and their confusion represents one of the commonest types of palaeographical error: the substitution of one word—here a name—for another (cf. A. Dain, *Les Manuscrits* [Paris, 1964], 42–3). The error was no doubt aided by the prevalence of Irene as a name in Byzantine times. Evadne therefore should be restored to her rightful place beside Alcestis in *Mor.* 243 d.

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¹ M. Winterbottom points out to me that the elder Seneca three times sets the deeds of Evadne and Alcestis side by side, though

without giving the name of either. *Contr.* 2. 2. 1, 2. 5. 8, and 10. 3. 2.

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS, *DE FATO* 190. 26 ff.¹

τῷ γὰρ τοῦτο πεπιστευκóτι οὐκ ἐπιτιμῆσαι τι, οὐκ ἐπαινέσαι τινα . . . οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖν οἷόν τε τῶν ὀφειλομένων εὐλόγως γίνεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν καὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν ἕκαστον ὧν ποιοῦσιν τὴν ἐξουσίαν πεπιστευκóτων.

πεπιστευκóτι Schwarz: πεπιστευμένῳ codd.

ALEXANDER is arguing that our responsibility for what we do (ἐφ' ἡμῖν) is grounded in the fact that a man is the ἀρχή of his own actions (cf. Aristotle, *E.N.* 3. 1111^a21, 1112^b31, etc.). The opponents of this view, he says, hold that nothing performed by a man is such that at the time when he does something he also has the possibility of not doing it, πιστεύσαντες τῷ μηδὲν τῶν γινόμενων ὑπὸ τινος οὕτως γίνεσθαι, ὥς καὶ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν αὐτὸ τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἔχοντος τότε (190. 24–6). One who believes this, he argues, cannot make any moral judgements or do any of the things 'which ought reasonably to be brought

¹ All references are to the page and line of Ivo Bruns's edition, 'Alexandri Aphrodisi-

ensis Scripta minora': *Supplementum Aristotelicum* ii. 2 (Berlin Academy, 1892).

about by those who have believed the possibility also of doing each of the things which they do'. My translation has, I hope, shown the need for a negative in the last clause: 'the possibility also of not doing' is the point needed; so insert *μή* between *τοῦ* and *ποιεῖν*. For omission of the negative elsewhere in *De fato* cf. 165. 1; 179. 21; 189. 6; 195. 26; 202. 12; 207. 19; 211. 18.

Bruns seems to have seen the difficulty since he notes: 'fortasse ποιοῦσιν <ἢ μὴ ποιεῖν ἔχειν>'. Certainly *τὴν ἐξουσίαν πεπιστευκότων* is very harsh, but I find Bruns's introduction of *ἢ μὴ ποιεῖν* following *ὑπὸ τῶν καὶ τοῦ (μὴ) ποιεῖν* unconvincing. The whole point of *καί* is to supply the contrast with the determinists. They believe only that one can do what one does; but those whom Alexander mentions here must be 'men who believe also in the possibility of not doing what they do'. Bruns may be right to supply *ἔχειν* after *ἐξουσίαν*, but it is far easier on palaeographical grounds to read *τῇ ἐξουσίαι*.

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